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Abstract
This paper investigates the problem good-case latency of Byzantine agreement, broadcast
and state machine replication in the synchronous authenticated setting. The good-case latency
measure captures the time it takes to reach agreement when all non-faulty parties have the
same input (or in BB/SMR when the sender/leader is non-faulty) and all messages arrive in-
stantaneously. Previous result implies a lower bound showing that any Byzantine agreement or
broadcast protocol tolerating more than n/3 faults must have a good-case latency of at least ∆
[2], where ∆ is the assumed maximum message delay. Our first result is a matching tight upper
bound for a family of protocols we call 1∆. We propose a protocol 1∆-BA that solves Byzantine
agreement in the synchronous and authenticated setting with optimal good-case latency of ∆
and optimal resilience f < n/2. We then extend our protocol and present 1∆-BB and 1∆-SMR
for Byzantine fault tolerant broadcast and state machine replication, respectively, in the same
setting and with the same optimal good-case latency of ∆ and f < n/2 fault tolerance. Our
1∆-SMR upper bound closes the gap between the best current solution, Sync HotStuff, which
obtains a good-case latency of 2∆ per command and the lower bound of ∆ on good-case latency.
Finally, we investigate weaker notions of the synchronous setting and show how to adopt the
1∆ approach to these models.
1 Introduction
Byzantine agreement (BA) and Byzantine broadcast (BB) are fundamental problems in distributed
computing. In Byzantine agreement, each replica has an input and each must decide on an output.
All non-faulty (honest) replicas must decide on the same output. Moreover, if all honest replicas
have the same input then this must be the decision output. In Byzantine broadcast, there is a
designated sender that sends its input to all replicas, and all honest replicas must decide on the
same output. Moreover, if the sender is honest, then the decision output must be sender’s input.
One of the most important practical applications of BA and BB is to implement Byzantine fault
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tolerant (BFT) state machine replication (SMR) [31], which provides clients with the illusion of
a single honest server, by ensuring that all honest replicas agree on the same sequence of client
inputs.
It is well known that under asynchrony or partial synchrony, the optimal resilience for any BA,
BB or BFT SMR protocol is f < n/3 [14, 8]. In order to move beyond f < n/3, we need to assume
a synchronous [14] and authenticated [17] setting. The optimal resilience for BA and BFT SMR in
the synchronous authenticated setting is f < n/2, and f < n for BB in the same setting. However,
synchronous BA, BB and BFT SMR have been considered impractical for a long time for several
reasons.
Firstly, to take advantage of the synchrony assumption, most theoretical works on Byzantine
agreement and broadcast assume lock-step execution [22, 12, 11, 21], where replicas start and end
each round at the same time. As a result, the latency of BA/BB protocols is typically measured
by the round complexity. Such a lock-step assumption simplifies the protocol design but it is
considered impractical because it not only is hard to enforce but also leads to poor performance. A
synchronous protocol requires a known upper bound ∆ for the maximum message delay. To be safe
under worst-case network conditions, ∆ has to be picked conservatively, i.e., much larger than the
actual (unknown) message delay bound. If a protocol that runs in lock steps, it must allocate ∆
time for every step. Then, most of the time is wasted on waiting for the next round to start rather
than doing any useful work. Only recently, synchronous BFT SMR protocols deviated from the
lock-step approach [19, 2]. In these protocols, most of the steps are non-blocking, namely, replicas
move to the next step as soon as enough messages are received from the previous step.
Secondly, classical BA/BB protocols [12] tend to optimize their worst-case latency. Because
the worst-case number of rounds required is f + 1 for tolerating f faults [16] and f is typically
assumed to be linear in n, any BA/BB protocol will inevitably have a poor worst-case latency as n
increases. However, in contrast, BFT SMR protocols typically care about the good-case, in which
a stable honest leader stays in charge and drives consensus on many decisions. While a line of
work studies expected-case [15, 21, 1] latency, this metric is still very different from the good-case
latency in SMR, because it essentially analyzes the expected number of times the protocol changes
its leader.
Another relatively minor disconnect lies in the “life cycle” of the protocol. Theoretical BA/BB
considers consensus on a single value and require all replicas to halt or terminate after agreeing on
this single value. In contrast, practical SMR protocols are intended to run forever; replicas commit
or decide on an ever-growing sequence of values.
Motivated by the above considerations, we argue that there is a need for a more refined model
for BA and BB to better capture practice. First, lock-step execution should not be assumed .
Latency should be measured in time as opposed to rounds. Furthermore, for a more accurate
characterization of latency, we adopt the separation between the conservative bound ∆ and the
actual (unknown) bound δ as suggested in [20, 25]. Finally, instead of measuring only the traditional
worst-case latency to terminate, we use the good-case latency to commit as the main metric, which
is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (good-case latency for Byzantine fault tolerant state machine replication). The good-
case latency is the maximal latency (over all adversarial strategies) until all honest replicas commit
given:
1. (good leader) An honest leader is in charge.
2. (good network) All messages arrive instantaneously, i.e., δ = 0.
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3. (good compute) All local computation is instantaneous.
Of course, in practice, communication and computation are never instantaneous, but the good
case definition captures the intuition that they are much smaller than the pessimistic upper bound
∆.
From the good-case latency definition of BFT SMR above, it is natural to define the good-case
latency for BB by replacing the good leader property with good sender : the designated sender is
honest. Similarly, we define the good-case latency for BA by replacing the good leader property
with good input : all honest replicas have the same input. The good input property also ties back
to the good-case of BFT SMR because if the leader is honest, then all honest replicas receive the
same input from the leader.
The main goal of our paper is to develop BA and BB protocols with optimal good-case latency
and apply them to BFT SMR protocols under the synchronous and authenticated setting. First,
noticing that for f < n/3, one can use any partially synchronous or asynchronous protocol (possibly
in unauthenticated setting) to achieve a good-case latency of zero. As mentioned, in order to move
beyond f < n/3 and to obtain the optimal resilience f < n/2 for BA and BFT SMR, we need to
assume a synchronous [14] and authenticated [17] setting. We first show a lower bound of ∆ on
the good-case latency, adapted from a lower bound in Sync HotStuff [2] which closely follows [14].
We remark that the lower bound in [2] only mentioned the good sender property (for broadcast)
but not the good network property. Hence, if interpreted literally, the bound in [2] is rather weak
or even vacuous; we elaborate and strengthen the lower bound using our definition of good-case
latency as follows and restate the proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Any Byzantine agreement or broadcast protocol that is resilient to f ≥ n/3 faults
must have a good-case latency at least ∆.
It is worth mentioning that a lower bound in the earlier work [3] implies a ∆ lower bound on
good-case latency for crash-tolerant agreement with f ≥ n/2 faults, but it does not directly implies
the lower bound above with f ≥ n/3 Byzantine faults.
The state of the art good-case latency of BA/BB protocols in the synchronous authenticated
setting is implied by Sync HotStuff [2]. Sync HotStuff is a BFT SMR protocol with good-case
latency of 2∆, and a single-shot version of Sync HotStuff naturally implies a BA/BB protocol with
good-case latency of 2∆. In fact, the authors in [2] conjectured that 2∆ is the optimal good-case
latency possible. In this paper, we refute this conjecture and present the following main results.
Byzantine Agreement, Broadcast, and State Machine Replication with Optimal Good-case
Latency of ∆. A key contribution of this paper is the first Byzantine agreement protocol 1∆-BA
in the synchronous authenticated setting with optimal good-case latency of ∆ and optimal resilience
of f < n/2. We also obtain a Byzantine broadcast protocol 1∆-BB with optimal good-case latency
of ∆ after small modifications. By proposing protocols 1∆-BA and 1∆-BB with good-case latency
of ∆, we close the gap between the upper bound and lower bound on good-case latency for Byzantine
agreement and broadcast. We then give a state machine replication protocol named 1∆-SMR that
has good-case latency of ∆ and optimal resilience of f < n/2.
Extensions with optimal good-case latency under weaker models. To make the synchronous
model more practical, we consider two types of additional fault suggested in the literature named
mobile link failures and mobile sluggish faults. The mobile link failure model [29, 7] assumes a
certain fraction of send and receive links can be down at each replica. The mobile sluggish fault
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model [9, 18, 2] considers the slow connection of some honest replicas whose message sending and
receiving does not respect the assumed delay bound ∆. We show that our protocols can be extended
to tolerate the mobile link failures and mobile sluggish faults while keeping the good-case latency
optimal. The optimal good-case latency becomes 2∆ under mobile link failures by a new lower
bound we prove. With mobile sluggish faults, the optimal good-case latency remains ∆.
2 Preliminary
We consider n replicas in a reliable, authenticated all-to-all network, where up to f replicas can
be malicious and behave in a Byzantine fashion, and rest of the replicas are honest. We assume
standard digital signatures and public-key infrastructure (PKI). We use 〈x〉p to denote a signed
message x by replica p.
Pessimistic message delay bound ∆ and actual message delay bound δ. In this paper, we consider
a synchronous system, where the message delay is bounded. Let δ denote the actual upper bound of
the message delay in the network, so any message from a non-faulty sender will be delivered within
δ time after being sent. The parameter δ is unknown to the protocol designer and used only in the
model definition, not in any protocol. The synchronous model assumes a known upper bound ∆
for the message delay δ, i.e., δ ≤ ∆. In practice, the parameter ∆ is usually conservative for safety
reasons, and thus δ  ∆. To put the new model into context, we remark on its natural connection
to partial synchrony: in partial synchrony, there is also an unknown message delay bound δ but
the protocol designer does not know any upper bound on δ.
Non-lock-step and clock skew. Although we assume synchrony, unlike most synchronous protocols
that require lock-step execution (replicas start and end each round at the same time), our protocols
do not proceed in a lock-step fashion, following the recent synchronous BFT SMR protocols which
deviated from the lock-step approach [19, 2]. We assume replicas have clock skew at most σ, i.e.,
they start protocol at most σ apart from each other. The bounded clock skew can be guaranteed
via any clock synchronization protocol, such as [10, 1]. The above clock synchronization protocols
can also handle bounded clock drifts. For simplicity, we assume there’s no clock drift.
Definition 2 (Byzantine Agreement). A Byzantine agreement protocol provides the following three
guarantees.
• Agreement. If two honest replicas commit value b and b′ respectively, then b = b′.
• Termination. All honest replicas eventually commit and terminate.
• Validity. If all honest replicas have the same input value, then all honest replicas commit on
the value.
The Byzantine broadcast is defined by changing the validity to require that if the designated
sender is honest, then all honest replicas commit on the sender’s value.
Definition 3 (Byzantine Fault tolerant State Machine Replication [2]). A Byzantine fault tolerant
state machine replication protocol commits client requests as a linearizable log to provide a consistent
view of the log akin to a single non-faulty server, providing the following two guarantees.
• Safety. Honest replicas do not commit different values at the same log position.
• Liveness. Each client request is eventually committed by all honest replicas.
4
3 Byzantine Agreement/Broadcast with Optimal Good-case La-
tency
We first present a synchronous Byzantine agreement protocol 1∆-BA with optimal good-case la-
tency of ∆ and optimal resilience of f < n/2. Without loss of generality, we assume n = 2f+1. Our
protocol incurs a good-case latency of ∆, which is optimal due to the ∆ lower bound (Theorem 1).
The protocol can be naturally extended to a protocol 1∆-BB that solves Byzantine broadcast with
optimal good-case latency. Our protocols close the gap for the good-case latency of synchronous
BA and BB and refutes a conjectured 2∆ lower bound in Abraham et al. [2].
3.1 Intuition
We start by presenting the rationale of the conjec-
Figure 1: Graphical representation of
the intuition for the conjectured 2∆
lower bound.
tured 2∆ lower bound [2] and how our protocol disproves
it. We present the intuition in the context of Byzan-
tine broadcast for simplicity, but similar arguments hold
for Byzantine agreement as well. The conjecture argues
that two ∆ periods are needed for the following reasons.
First, now that we have departed from lock-step execu-
tion, two honest replicas may be “out-of-sync” by ∆ time.
For example, a Byzantine leader quickly delivers its first
message to one replica but takes ∆ time to deliver its
first message to another replica. Intuitively, this causes
a lagging replica to reach a point in the protocol ∆ time
after a leading replica. Second, any message sent by an
honest replica can take up to a ∆ time to arrive at another replica by the synchrony assumption.
In order to make sure that the sender did not equivocate (i.e., send different values to different
replicas), a leading replica h2 needs to wait for 2∆ time before it can hear from a lagging replica
h1 what h1 received from the sender (cf. Figure 1). Lastly, replicas seem to have no way to tell
whether they are leading or lagging, so all replicas wait for 2∆ time to ensure the absence of a
sender equivocation.
Note that the above intuition of the conjecture has an implicit assumption: if the sender equiv-
ocates, we want all replicas, leading or lagging, to detect sender’s equivocation. This is where the
intuition of the conjecture errs and what our protocol relies on to get below 2∆: we will make
equivocation detection asymmetric. To elaborate, if we reduce the waiting period to 1∆, a lagging
replica h1 can still learn from a leading replica h2 about what h2 receives from the sender, but not
vice versa. In other words, a lagging replica can still detect sender equivocation (if there’s any)
but the most leading replica may not. Hence, the most leading replica may commit a value despite
that the sender equivocated. But note that, all other honest replicas have detected equivocation
and hence, have not committed. As long as we carefully craft the rest of the protocol to make all
other honest replicas eventually commit the same value as the leading replica, the protocol is safe.
Also note that this is the Byzantine-sender scenario, so the rest of the protocol does not have to
meet the 1∆ deadline.
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3.2 1∆-BA Protocol under Synchrony
We now describe the 1∆-BA presented in Figure 2, which starts at Step 1 and proceeds in an
event-driven manner where a step is executed if certain conditions are satisfied. For simplicity, we
first assume that all replicas start the protocol at the same time t = 0, and our results can be easily
extended to the case where there is clock skew (see the discussion later in this section). Initially, all
replicas have an input, and set their locked value blck to be some default value ⊥. When protocol
starts, all replicas first sign and broadcast its input value, and try to form a proposal containing
f + 1 signed messages of an identical value (Step 1). When any replica i forms a proposal of value
b from the previous step or receives a valid proposal of value b from other replicas, it forwards
the proposal to detect conflict (Step 2). Due to the non-lock-step execution of our protocol, it is
possible that a replica receives the proposal forwarded by some other replica first, then forms its own
proposal. Step 2 may be executed multiple times, if the replica observes multiple valid proposals.
If no valid proposal is ever formed or received, all replicas do nothing until time 4∆ and invoke a
BA at Step 5 with input blck = ⊥, which ensures the agreement and termination of the protocol.
Otherwise, after the replica forwards the proposal, it locally starts a timer called vote-timer to
wait for ∆ time period. If the timer expires and the replica does not receive any conflicting proposal
containing a different value b′ 6= b, it broadcasts a vote message for the proposal (Step 3). Once
the replica gathers f+1 distinct vote messages for the proposal containing value b within time 3∆,
it broadcasts these vote messages, sets locked value blck = b and commits the value b. If the f + 1
distinct vote messages for value b are received later than 3∆, the replica only sets locked value
blck = b without committing the value (Step 4). As will be proved in Theorem 3, in the good-case,
every honest replica will receive f + 1 vote messages within 3∆ time. For other cases, if some
replica commits to a value by time 3∆, since it forwards the f + 1 vote messages to all replicas, all
replicas will set blck to the committed value within 4∆ time. At time 4∆, the replica initiates an
instance of Byzantine agreement with its locked value as the input, and any replica that has not
committed yet will commit on the output of the agreement (Step 5).
Why does it suffice to wait for ∆ time before sending vote? Consider any two honest replicas h
and h′ who receive conflicting proposals containing values b at time t and b′ at time t′ respectively.
Without loss of generality, suppose t ≤ t′. Observe that h’s forwarded proposal will arrive at h′
by t + ∆ ≤ t′ + ∆, which is within the ∆ waiting period of h′. Thus, h′ will not vote and will
not commit. This argument holds for any two pairs of honest replicas, and hence only the value
of the proposal first voted by any honest replica may potentially be committed by a set of honest
replicas at Step 4. Now these committed honest replicas will forwards the f +1 distinct votes to all
replicas no later than time 3∆. All other honest replicas will receive these by time 4∆ and will set
blck to the committed value. Thus, in the Byzantine agreement at Step 5, all honest replicas will
start with the same value, and the output of BA will be the committed value to ensure agreement
among all honest replicas.
Remark on the Byzantine agreement primitive. We can plug in any Byzantine agreement protocol
that tolerates f < n/2 faults and satisfies standard Byzantine agreement definition (Definition 2)
at Step 5. Note that the latency of the BA protocol does not affect the good-case latency of 1∆-BA
protocol, since in the good-case, then all honest replicas can commit the value at Step 4 of the
protocol before invoking the BA (Theorem 3). For the same reason, it is fine to plug in a lock-step
BA protocol since the poor latency of lock-step BA does not affect the good-case latency. Protocol
1∆-BA proceeds in a non-lock-step fashion under the good-case. With foresight, we also note that
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Initially, every replica i has an input bi, starts the protocol at the same time t = 0, and sets
blck = ⊥.
1. Propose. Sign and send the input value bi to all others. Once receiving f + 1 distinct
signed messages of the same value b, form a proposal B with these messages as B =
{〈b〉j}f+1.
2. Forward. Upon forming or receiving a valid new proposal B containing f + 1 distinct
signed messages of the same value b, forward B to all other replicas, set vote-timerB
for proposal B to ∆ and start counting down.
3. Vote. When vote-timerB for proposal B containing value b reaches 0, if the replica
does not receive another valid proposal B′ containing f + 1 distinct signed messages of
a different value b′ 6= b, it broadcasts a vote in the form of 〈vote, B〉i.
4. Commit. Upon collecting f + 1 distinct signed votes 〈vote, B〉 of a valid proposal B
containing value b at time t, (i) if t ≤ 3∆, it broadcasts these f + 1 votes, sets blck = b,
and commits b, (ii) if t > 3∆, it sets blck = b.
5. Byzantine agreement. At time 4∆, invoke an instance of Byzantine agreement with
blck as the input. If not committed, commit on the output of the Byzantine agreement.
Terminate.
Figure 2: 1∆-BA Protocol under the Synchronous Model
when we apply this protocol to implement SMR, the BA will be replaced by (roughly speaking)
subsequent iterations of Step 2–4 where each iteration uses a new leader.
When a clock skew σ exists. Now we show that how to extend the results to the case when there
exists a clock skew σ so that replicas may start the protocol at times at most σ apart from each
other. Since any replica may start the protocol at most σ earlier than any other replica, it will
receive f + 1 vote messages within 3∆ + σ in the good-case, and therefore the forwarded vote
messages reaches all honest replicas within 4∆ + σ at their local time. Therefore, the parameter
3∆ in the conditions at Step 4 is replaced with 3∆ +σ, and the parameter 4∆ at Step 5 is replaced
with 4∆+σ. Due to clock skew, replicas may invoke the BA at Step 5 at times at most σ away from
each other. Therefore, the BA primitive also need to tolerate up to σ clock skew. For instance, any
lock-step BA can do so by setting each round duration to be 2∆ and use a clock synchronization
algorithm [10, 1] to enforce the lock-step synchrony. Since the value of σ is unknown, we can assume
σ = ∆ as the worst-case clock skew.
3.3 Correctness of Protocol 1∆-BA
Lemma 1. If an honest replica commits value b at Step 4, then (i) no honest replica commit any
other value b′ 6= b at Step 4, and (ii) all honest replicas set blck = b before invoking the Byzantine
agreement at Step 5.
Proof. Suppose an honest replica commits b at Step 4 after receiving f + 1 vote messages. Then
at least one honest replica h forwards the proposal B containing b at time t, and sends the vote
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message at time t+ ∆.
First, we show that for any value b′ 6= b, there does not exist f+1 distinct signed vote messages
for proposal B′ that contains b′. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there exists f + 1 vote
messages for B′. Then at least one vote for B′ comes from an honest replica h′. Let t′ denote the
time when h′ forwards the proposal. If t′ ≤ t, then the forwarded proposal B′ from h′ containing
the value b′ will reach h no later than t′ + ∆ ≤ t+ ∆, which will prevent h from sending the vote
message, a contradiction. If t′ > t, then similarly the forwarded proposal B from h containing the
value b will reach h′ no later than t + ∆ < t′ + ∆, which will prevent h′ from sending the vote
message, a contradiction. The same argument applies for any honest replica that may have voted
for proposal B′. Hence, there does not exist f + 1 distinct signed vote messages for proposal B′
that contains value b′ 6= b, and no honest replica commits to any other value b′ 6= b at Step 4.
For part (ii), since an honest replica h commits b at time t ≤ 3∆, and forwards the f + 1 votes
for proposal B that contains b to all replicas, all honest replicas receives f + 1 votes no later than
time 4∆. Since there is no f + 1 votes for other proposal that contains value b′ 6= b, all honest
replicas set blck = b before invoking the Byzantine agreement in Step 5.
Theorem 2. 1∆-BA protocol solves Byzantine agreement in the synchronous authenticated setting
with optimal good-case latency of ∆ and optimal resilience of f < n/2.
Proof. Agreement. If all honest replicas commit at Step 5, then due to the agreement property
of the Byzantine agreement primitive, all honest replicas commit on the same value. Otherwise,
there must be some honest replica that commits at Step 4. Let h denote the first honest replica
that commits, and let b denote the committed value. By Lemma 1, no other value is committed
by any honest replica at Step 4, and all honest replicas set blck = b before invoking the Byzantine
agreement primitive at Step 5. Therefore, when invoking the BA primitive at Step 5, the inputs of
all honest replicas are the same. Then by the validity condition of the BA primitive, the output of
the agreement is also b. Any honest replica that does not commit at Step 4 will commit on value
b at Step 5.
Termination. According to the protocol, honest replicas terminate at Step 5, and they commit
a value before termination. At time 4∆, all honest replicas invoke an instance of Byzantine agree-
ment. Termination follows from the termination property of this Byzantine agreement instance.
Validity. If all honest replicas initially have the same value b as input, then we show that all
honest replicas are able to commit b at Step 4. After Step 1, all honest replicas receive f + 1 signed
messages of value b and form the same proposal B after at most ∆ time. Since there are at most f
Byzantine replicas, no other proposal B′ containing f + 1 signed message for another value b′ 6= b
can be formed. Therefore, during the ∆ waiting period before Step 3, no other proposal B′ will be
received by any honest replica, and all honest replicas send the vote messages at Step 3. Finally,
the vote messages reach all honest replicas after at most ∆ time, leading to all honest replicas to
commit on the value b within 3∆ time at Step 4.
Good-case latency. In the good case, all honest replicas have the same input b. Therefore,
all honest replicas form the same proposal at δ after receiving each other’s value, and no other
conflicting proposal can be formed. Then, all honest replica will wait for time ∆ before sending
the vote message. Next, the above vote messages reach all honest replicas after δ time, and all
honest replicas commit on the sender’s proposal at time ∆ + 2δ = ∆.
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3.4 1∆-BB under Synchrony
The 1∆-BA protocol can be easily extended to Byzantine broadcast with small modifications.
Recall that the good-case latency for Byzantine broadcast is defined when the designated sender is
honest. The protocol is given in Figure 3. The main differences are (i) at Step 1, the designated
sender broadcasts its input, instead of the input exchange among all replicas in 1∆-BA, and (ii)
the proposal at Step 2-4 contains only the value signed by the sender from Step 1, instead of f + 1
values signed by replicas. As a result, the proofs are analogous to 1∆-BA and we omit them. Note
that 1∆-BB has resilience f < n/2, which is not optimal.
Initially, every replica i starts the protocol at the same time t = 0, and sets blck = ⊥.
1. Propose. The designated sender L with input b sends 〈propose, b〉L to all replicas.
2. Step 2-5 is identical to Step 2-5 of 1∆-BA, except that the proposal contains only one
value signed by the leader instead of f + 1 signed values, and replica detects conflict
when receiving two different proposals signed by the leader at Step 3.
Figure 3: 1∆-BB Protocol under the Synchronous Model
Theorem 3. 1∆-BB protocol solves Byzantine broadcast in the synchronous authenticated setting
with optimal good-case latency of ∆.
4 State Machine Replication with Good-case Latency of ∆
In this section, inspired by the techniques from protocol 1∆-BA and 1∆-BB, we construct a Byzan-
tine fault tolerant state machine replication protocol 1∆-SMR that has a good-case latency of ∆
and optimal resilience of f < n/2.
1∆-SMR protocol (Figure 4) takes the stable leader approach that proceeds in views, which
consists a steady state, and a view-change to replace a Byzantine leader. In the steady state, the
leader of the current view is responsible for making progress, where view is a integer that increments
after each view-change. The leader of a view can simply be elected by round-robin, i.e., the replica
(v mod n) where v is the view number and n is the number of replicas. If the leader behaves
maliciously or does not make progress, the replicas will blame the leader and start the view-change
protocol to replace the leader.
We introduce some terminology that will be used in our protocol.
Block format, block extension and equivocation. Clients’ requests are batched into
blocks, and the protocol outputs a chain of blocks B1, B2, ..., Bk, ... where Bk is the block at height
k. Each block Bk has the following format Bk = (bk, hk−1) where bk is a batch of new client requests
and hk−1 = H(Bk−1) is the hash digest of the previous block at height k − 1. We say that a block
Bl extends another block Bk, if Bk is an ancestor of Bl according to the hash chaining where l ≥ k.
We define two blocks Bl and B
′
l′ to be equivocating, if they are not equal and do not extend on
another. As it will become clear in the protocol, we also define two proposals to be equivocating,
if they are proposed and signed by the leader in the same view and both have S 6= ⊥. The block
chaining simplifies the protocol in the sense that once a block is committed, its ancestors can also
be committed.
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Certificate, certificate ranking. A quorum certificate is a set of signatures on a block by
a quorum of replicas, which consists of f + 1 replicas out of 2f + 1 replicas for 1∆-SMR. We use
Cv(Bk) to denote a certificate for Bk in view v, consisting of f + 1 distinct signed vote messages
for block Bk. Certified blocks are ranked first by the views that they are created and then by their
heights, that is, blocks with higher views have higher ranks, and blocks with higher height have
higher ranks if the view numbers are equal. We use Bv to denote a blame certificate in view v,
consisting of f + 1 distinct blame messages in view v.
Since the clients’ requests are batched into blocks, the BFT SMR protocol achieves safety if
honest replicas always commit the same block Bk for each height k, and liveness if all honest
replicas keep committing new blocks. When it is clear in the protocol, a replica broadcasting a
message means it sending the message to all other replicas; it does not mean invoking a Byzantine
broadcast instance.
4.1 1∆-SMR Protocol under Synchrony
Here we describe the protocol 1∆-SMR in Figure 4. In the steady state of the protocol, the leader
L of the current view v can propose blocks chained by block hashes every α time, where α > 0 is a
predefined parameter. The steady state of 1∆-SMR is similar to Step 1-4 of protocol 1∆-BB, and
uses similar techniques such as proposal forwarding and the ∆ waiting time before voting. For the
first proposal after a view-change, the leader proposes a block that extends the highest certified
block known to the leader (from the status messages received). For other proposals, each proposed
block extends the last proposed block (Step 1). We assume that the honest replicas are always able
to generate and propose valid proposal blocks. Once any replica receives a new valid proposal from
the leader L, it forwards the proposal (Step 2) for equivocation check. Due to the non-lock-step
nature of our protocol, it is possible that a replica receives the proposal from the re-proposal of
some other replica first. In this case, the replica also accept the proposal if it is valid. Then, once
the replica has all blocks in the chain that the proposal block is extending, and the proposal block
extends the highest certified block, it locally starts a timer called vote-timer to wait for ∆ time
(Step 2). When the timer expires and the replica does not receive any equivocating block signed by
the leader L or a blame certificate (containing f + 1 blame messages), it broadcast a vote message
in the form of 〈vote, Bk, v〉 (Step 3). Once the replica gathers f + 1 distinct vote messages to
form a certificate for the block Bk without receiving a blame certificate (containing f + 1 blame
messages) or equivocating blocks, it forwards the vote certificate Cv(b), commits the block Bk and
all its ancestor blocks (Step 4). The forwarding of vote certificate notifies other replicas to update
their highest certified block before entering the next view.
When the leader is Byzantine, it can deviate from the protocol by either stalling or equivocating
1. To ensure liveness, the view-change protocol will be triggered when a quorum (f+1 out of 2f+1)
of replicas discover the malicious behaviors of the current leader. If the current leader does not
keep proposing valid blocks quick enough, any replica that does not commit blocks in time will
blame the leader by sending a blame message. The time period of 6∆ + (p − 1)α is sufficient for
p proposals from an honest leader to be committed (see the proof of Theorem 5). Note that the
above time period only occur during the view-change, and does not affect the good-case latency of
the protocol when a honest leader is in charge. If the leader equivocates, when any replica receives
1In practice, the Byzantine leader may also censor clients’ requests, i.e., always proposes blocks with its own
requests or transactions. Any BFT SMR protocol should have a scheme to prevent such censoring. For our protocol,
we can either do leader rotations regularly, or add another blame rule for censoring to replace the Byzantine leader.
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Steady State Protocol for Replica i
Let v be the current view number and replica L be the leader of the current view. The leader
proposes a block every α time, where α is a parameter.
1. Propose. The leader L sends 〈propose, Bk,S, v〉L to all other replicas, where Bk =
(bk, hk−1) is a height-k block, containing a batch of new client requests bk and a hash
digest hk−1 = H(Bk−1) of a height-(k − 1) block Bk−1. For the first proposal in a new
view after a view-change, S is a set of f + 1 distinct signed status messages received
during the view-change, and Bk−1 is the highest certified block among blocks in S.
Otherwise, S = ⊥ and Bk−1 is the last block proposed by L.
2. Forward. Upon receiving a valid new proposal 〈propose, Bk,S, v〉L, forward the pro-
posal to all other replicas. Once one of the following conditions is true: (1) S contains
f + 1 distinct signed status messages, Bk extends the highest certified block in S, and
Bk extends a chain known to the replica, or (2) S = ⊥, Bk extends the highest certified
block known to the replica, and Bk extends a chain known to the replica, perform the
following. For any block in the chain that Bk extends, broadcast the block if the replica
hasn’t forwarded it yet. Set vote-timerk to ∆ and start counting down.
3. Vote. When vote-timerk reaches 0, if no equivocating blocks/proposals signed by L
or a blame certificate Bv are received, send a vote to all other replicas in the form of
〈vote, Bk, v〉i.
4. Commit. Upon receiving f +1 distinct signed vote messages for block Bk, if no equiv-
ocating blocks/proposals signed by L or a blame certificate Bv are received, broadcast
the vote certificate Cv(Bk) containing f+1 votes, and commit Bk with all its ancestors.
View-change Protocol for Replica i
Let L and L′ be the leader of view v and v + 1 respectively.
1. Blame. If less than p valid blocks are committed in 6∆ + (p − 1)α time in view
v, broadcast 〈blame, v〉i. If equivocating blocks/proposals signed by L are received,
broadcast 〈blame, v〉i and the two equivocating blocks/proposals.
2. New-view. Upon receiving f + 1 distinct signed 〈blame, v〉 messages, form a blame
certificate Bv, broadcast Bv, abort all vote-timer(s) and stop sending vote in view v.
Wait for 2∆ time and enter view v+1. Upon entering view v+1, send the new leader L′
a 〈status, Bk′ , Cv′(Bk′), v〉i message where Cv′(Bk′) is certificate for the highest certified
block Bk′ . (Ignore any block certified in view ≤ v that is received after this point.) If
the replica is the new leader L′, wait for another 2∆ time upon entering view v + 1.
Figure 4: 1∆-SMR under the Synchronous Model
the equivocating blocks, it will also blame the leader by broadcasting a blame message and the pair
of equivocating blocks to help other replicas detect the equivocation. Once the replica collects f+1
blame messages, it forms and broadcasts a blame certificate, aborts the timer and stops voting in
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view v. Then the replica waits for a 2∆ period before entering the next view v+1. The 2∆ waiting
period is for receiving the vote certificate from other replicas. Then, when entering the new view,
the replica sends the certificate of the highest known certified block to the new leader, and returns
to the steady state. If a replica is the new leader, it needs to wait for another 2∆ time period in
order to receive the status messages sent by all honest replicas during view-change.
4.2 Correctness of Protocol 1∆-SMR
We say a block Bk is committed directly, if the replica commits Bk at Step 4 by receiving Cv(Bk)
but no equivocating blocks or blame certificate Bv. A block Bk is committed indirectly, if Bk is
committed because it is the ancestor of a directly committed block.
Lemma 2. If an honest replica directly commits a block Bl in view v, then a certified block that
ranks no lower than Cv(Bl) must equal or extend Bl.
The proof of Lemma 2 is is very similar to that of Lemma 1 and is presented in Appendix B.1
due to lack of space.
Theorem 4 (Safety). Honest replicas always commit the same block Bk for each height k.
Proof. Suppose two blocks Bk and B
′
k are committed at height k at any two honest replicas.
Suppose Bk is committed due to Bl being directly committed in view v, and B
′
k is committed due
to B′l′ being directly committed in view v
′. Without loss of generality, suppose v ≤ v′, and for
v = v′, further assume that l ≤ l′. Since Bl is directly committed and Bl′ is certified and ranks no
lower than Cv(Bl), by Lemma 2, Bl′ must equal or extend Bl. Thus, B′k = Bk.
Theorem 5 (Liveness). All honest replicas keep committing new blocks.
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in Appendix B.2 due to lack of space.
Theorem 6 (Good-case Latency). In the good-case, every proposed block will be committed in ∆
time after being proposed.
Proof. In the good-case, the leader is honest, and its proposal will take time δ to reach all replicas.
Then, all honest replica will wait for time ∆ before sending the vote message. Finally, the above
vote messages reach all honest replicas after δ time, leading to commit at all honest replicas.
Therefore, the any proposed block will be committed in ∆+2δ = ∆ time if the leader is honest.
5 The Mobile Link Failure Model
Our previous protocols 1∆-BA, 1∆-BB and 1∆-SMR heavily relies on the synchrony assumption
that messages between honest replicas are delivered within ∆ time. Once this assumption is violated
even at only one honest replica, our protocols as well as most of the synchronous BFT protocols
would fail under certain executions. To make our protocols more practical, we further strengthen
them by considering the mobile link failures suggested in the literature [29, 7].
The mobile link failure captures the case where a certain fraction of the communication links
at any honest replica are controlled by the adversary so that the messages via these link may
be lost or delayed. We first generalize the mobile link failure model for non-lock-step synchrony,
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where synchronous protocols do not execute in a lock-step fashion. Then, we propose a generic
transformation to make a synchronous protocol tolerate mobile link failures. Applying the above
transformation to our previous protocols, we can obtain protocols for BA, BB and BFT SMR under
the mobile link failure model with good-case latency of 2∆. Lastly, we prove that 2∆ is a lower
bound for the good-case latency of BA/BB under the mobile link failure model (Section 5), showing
the optimality of our protocols.
The Mobile Link Failure Model without Lock-step Execution. We model the communication
channel between any two replicas as two directed links, and use (i, j) to denote the directed link
from replica i to replica j. Link (i, j) is called a send link of replica i, and a receive link for replica
j. Each replica has n send links and n receive links, including a link that connects itself.
Prior works [30, 6, 35, 29, 7] consider mobile link failures under lock-step synchrony: for each
lock step (or round), a link (i, j) is faulty if replica j does not receive the message sent by replica
i in this round. The link failure is mobile in the sense that the set of faulty links can change at
each round. Since our protocol does not require lock-step execution, we generalize the mobile link
failure model for non-lock-step synchrony as follows.
Under our non-lock-step model, each link is either faulty or non-faulty at any time point, and
two directions of a link between any two replicas may fail independently, i.e., link (i, j) may be
non-faulty while link (j, i) is faulty. If a link (i, j) is non-faulty at time t, then the message sent
by replica i at time t will be received by replica j at time ≤ t+ δ. Otherwise, the message may be
lost or delayed. Link failures are mobile in the sense that an adversary can control the set of faulty
links, subject to the following constraints.
1. The adversary can corrupt up to f sl send links and f
r
l receive links at any replica, as long as
fsl + f
r
l < n− f .
2. If a link turns from faulty to non-faulty at time t, it continues to count towards the threshold
of faulty links until t+ δ.
We explain the necessity of the above two constraints. Constraint (1) is necessary for solving BB
or BA under even static link failures [29], and hence also necessary under our definition of mobile link
failures. Constraint (2) states that a recovered link remains on the adversary’s corruption budget
for an additional δ time. Some constraint in this vein is necessary; otherwise, the adversary can
drop all messages with a budget of a single link failure. Since we assume no lock-step execution, it
is normal that no two honest nodes ever send messages at precisely the same time. Then, whenever
there is a message sent via a link at time t, the adversary can corrupt the link at time t and
immediately uncorrupt it. Also note that constraint (2) is consistent with the mobile link failure
model under lock-step synchrony. In the lock-step model, the set of faulty links remain unchanged
during a round, which has duration at least δ. Therefore, the mobile link failure model for lock-step
synchrony [29, 7] is a special case of our generalized definition above.
A generic transformation to tolerate mobile link failures under non-lock-step synchrony. In this
section, we show that given a Byzantine fault tolerant protocol under the synchronous model, there
is a generic approach to transform it into a protocol that handles mobile link failures as defined
in the previous section. In fact, it has been observed that under lock-step synchrony, a two-round
simulation under the mobile link failure model can implement a one-round multicast over non-faulty
links under the synchronous model (Corollary 1 of [29]).
Here, we present a similar transformation for non-lock-step synchronous protocols: (i) when any
replica receives a message described in the protocol, it forwards the message only once to all other
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replicas except the sender of the message, (ii) every timing parameter in the protocol is doubled,
i.e., if the original protocol waits for T time at some step, then the transformed protocol waits for
2T at that step.
The following lemma shows that after the generic transformation above, any message sent by
an honest replica will be received by all honest replicas after 2δ, implying a 2δ-delay simulation of
the synchronous model. Therefore, a protocol for the mobile link failure model can be obtained
from a protocol designed for the synchronous model.
Lemma 3. If an honest replica sends a message at time t, then all honest replicas receive the
message by time t+ 2δ.
Proof. Suppose an honest replica hs sends a message at time t and another honest replica ht does
not receive the message by time t + 2δ. Let A be the set of honest replicas that are connected to
non-faulty send links of hs at time t. Since the number of faulty send links at hs is at most f
s
l ,
|A| ≥ n− f − fsl . According to the model of mobile link failures in Section 5, replicas in A receive
the message by time ≤ t+ δ. Each replica in A tries to relay the message to ht some time between
t and t+ δ. In order for ht not to receive the message by t+ 2δ, all these |A| attempts have to fail.
But in this case, by constraint (2), all these |A| ≥ n − f − fsl receive links of ht will be counted
as faulty at time t+ δ. This violates constraint (1), which states that less than n− f − fsl receive
links can be counted as faulty at any replica at any time.
Lower bound on good-case latency under mobile link failures. Next, we show a lower bound
of 2∆ on the good-case latency for any Byzantine agreement protocol that tolerates mobile link
failures. In fact, we can prove the lower bound with static link failures. The lower bound holds for
Byzantine broadcast as well, by an analogous proof.
Theorem 7. Any Byzantine agreement protocol in the synchronous authenticated setting that (i)
is resilient to ≥ n+13 Byzantine faults and (ii) tolerates at most fsl static send link failures and f rl
static receive link failures at each replica where fsl + f
r
l < n− f , must have a good-case latency of
at least 2∆.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that such a protocol exists. Let there be n = 3f − 1
replicas with f Byzantine replicas. Divide the replicas into three groups A,B,C, where |A| =
|C| = f − 1 and |B| = f + 1. All replicas are connected to each other, except that replicas in A
are disconnected to replicas in C due to the link failure. The construction satisfies the link failure
requirement since |A|+ |C| = 2f − 2 < n− f = 2f − 1. Consider the following three scenarios.
In scenario 1, it satisfies the good-case, and all honest replicas have input 0. All f − 1 replicas
in C are Byzantine. There is one Byzantine replica b in B, and the other f replicas in B are honest.
The Byzantine replica in C remain silent. The Byzantine replica b follows the protocol except the
following. (1) The replica b pretends that no message is received from the leader. (2) The replica
b pretends that no message is received from the remaining honest replicas in B, and b sends no
message to the honest replicas in B. (3) For any messages received from the replicas in A, replica b
pretends that the messages are received after a ∆ network delay (suppose Byzantine replicas know
the actual network delay δ, which is 0 in the good-case). Replica b also intentionally delays any
messages it sends, to pretend that the network delay is ∆. According to the validity condition, the
honest replicas in A and B will commit 0 within < 2∆ time.
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Scenario 2 is the mirror case of scenario 1 and satisfies the good-case, specified as follows. All
honest replicas have input 1. All f − 1 replicas in A are Byzantine and one replica b in B is
Byzantine. The Byzantine replicas in A remain silent. The Byzantine replica b follows the protocol
except the following. (1) The replica b pretends that no message is received from the leader. (2)
The replica b pretends that no message is received from the remaining honest replicas in B, and b
sends no message to the honest replicas in B. (3) For any messages received from the replicas in
C, replica b pretends that the messages are received after a ∆ network delay (suppose Byzantine
replicas know the actual network delay δ, which is 0 in the good-case). Replica b also intentionally
delays any messages it sends, to pretend that the network delay is ∆. According to the validity
condition, the honest replicas in C and B will commit 1 within < 2∆ time.
In scenario 3, f replicas in B are Byzantine, and the remaining one replica h in B is honest.
Replicas in A have input value 0, replicas in C have input value 1, and the replica h has no input
value. The Byzantine replicas in B behave to replicas in A exactly the same as the honest replicas
in B in scenario 1, behave to replicas in C exactly the same as the honest replicas in B in scenario
2, and send no message to the honest replica h in B. Suppose that the network delay between
honest replicas is δ = ∆ in scenario 3, then we can claim that replicas in A cannot distinguish
scenario 1 and 3 within time < 2∆.
• First, to replicas in A, the Byzantine replica b in B behaves in scenario 1 exactly the same
as the honest replica h in B behaves in scenario 3. In scenario 3, the network delay between
honest replicas in B and A is ∆, only messages sent by B at time < ∆ will be received by
replicas in A before they commit. Since any message from C reaches the honest replica h in
B at time ≥ ∆ in scenario 3, those messages from C do not influence the messages that h
sends to A that are received within time < 2∆. In scenario 1, the replicas in C are silent,
which also do not influence the messages that b sends to A before the replicas in A commit.
Also, the Byzantine replica b in B in scenario 1 pretends that no message is received from
the sender or from the honest replicas in B, and it pretends that the communication with
replicas in A has the maximum network delay ∆. Therefore, to replicas in A, the Byzantine
replica b in B in scenario 1 behaves exactly the same as the honest replica h in B in scenario
3.
• Also by construction, to replicas in A, the f Byzantine replicas in B in scenario 3 behave
exactly the same as the f honest replicas in B in scenario 1.
Therefore, replicas in A cannot distinguish scenario 1 and 3, and they will commit 0 in scenario
3 within time < 2∆. Similarly, replicas in C cannot distinguish scenario 2 and 3. Therefore the
replicas in C will commit 1 in scenario 3 within time < 2∆. However, this violates agreement since
honest replicas commit different values.
The mobile sluggish fault model. In the mobile sluggish fault model [9, 18, 2], an honest replica
is either sluggish or prompt at a given time. The messages sent or received by sluggish replicas may
be delayed in the network, while the prompt replicas follow the message delay bound. The set of
sluggish replicas is mobile in the sense that it can change at any instance of time. We present the
results for the mobile sluggish fault model in Appendix C.
Formally, if an honest replica r1 is prompt at time t1, then any message sent by r1 at time ≤ t1
will be received by any honest replica that is prompt at time t2 ≥ t1 + ∆. Intuitively, in the mobile
sluggish model, any message sent by a sluggish replica would satisfy the maximum message delay
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bound when the replica becomes prompt. We assume the number of honest and prompt replicas
is always > n/2 at any time, which is necessary to solve Byzantine agreement or broadcast under
the mobile sluggish fault model [18, 2].
Under the mobile sluggish fault model introduced above, we can increase the robustness of our
protocols 1∆-BA, 1∆-BB and 1∆-SMR to tolerate mobile sluggish faults using a technique that
adds extra communication rounds in the protocol, while keeping the optimal good-case latency ∆.
Comparison of the two models. Despite similarities of the mobile link failures and mobile sluggish
faults above, there are differences between these two models, including the following.
1. With mobile sluggish faults, an honest but sluggish replica cannot communicate with any
other replicas before it becomes prompt, whereas in mobile link failure model any honest
replicas always have a certain number of non-faulty links to send/receive messages.
2. The mobile sluggish model assumes the set of replicas that are Byzantine or sluggish must
be minority at any time, whereas in the mobile link failure model, the number of faulty send
and receive links must be less than n− f at any honest replica.
3. The set of sluggish replicas can change at any instance of time in mobile sluggish model,
while the set of faulty link in mobile link failure model can also change dynamically subject
to some constraints (see Section 5).
6 Related Work
Byzantine fault tolerant protocols. Byzantine fault tolerant protocols, first proposed by Lamport
[23], have received significant amount of attention for several decades. For Byzantine broadcast,
Dolev-Strong protocol [12] is a deterministic f + 1-round protocol with O(n2f) communication
complexity. The Dolev-Strong protocol can also be modified to solve authenticated BA for the
t < n/2 case with the same round and communication complexity. A sequence of effort has been
made on randomized protocol for reducing the round complexity and message complexity [4, 27, 21],
and most efficient solutions for both Byzantine agreement and broadcast are proposed by Abraham
et al. [1] with expected constant round and expected quadratic communication complexity. The
state-of-the-art BFT SMR protocol Sync HotStuff [2] improves the good-case latency to 2∆ under
the synchronous model. As a comparison, our protocol improves the good-case latency to ∆, which
is optimal for both cases. An earlier work [3] proposes a synchronous crash-tolerant agreement
protocol with latency (2f − 1)δ + ∆, and hence good-case latency ∆. Under partial synchrony,
a latency-optimal transformation from Byzantine consensus to BFT SMR is proposed in [33] for
building practical BFT SMR systems [5]. Another line of research aims at developing BFT protocols
with small latencies in the optimistic cases when certain conditions are satisfied, under synchrony
[26, 2] or asynchrony [13, 24, 32]. In particular, the notion of optimistic responsiveness [26, 2] is
proposed for synchronous BFT SMR protocols, where the protocol can make decisions in network
speed O(δ) when > 3n/4 votes are collected. It should be noted that our paper investigates the
upper and lower bounds for good-case latency defined under any adversary strategies, instead of
the optimistic case.
Weaker network models. The mobile link failure model. For models that has no restriction on
the number of failed links, Santoro and Widmayer [28] show that the consensus is unsolvable with
even a single process suffering from such link failure. Thus, the authors in [30] introduce a mobile
link failure model with constraints on the number of send and receive link failures. There has
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been a sequence of efforts on adapting existing consensus algorithms for the mobile link failure
model [6, 35], and results on the lower bounds on the required number of processes and rounds
[29]. Another line of work identifies the tight necessary and sufficient condition on the underlying
communication graph for solving iterative approximate consensus under mobile link failures [34].
The model and results above assume protocols of lock-step execution, and our results do not pose
such an assumption. The mobile sluggish fault model. Recently, Guo et al. consider a new model
that allows the bound ∆ on the message delay to be violated for a set of honest replicas under
synchrony, to better capture the reality when some honest replicas are partitioned or offline due to
network misbehavior. This type of faults is later called sluggish, and considered in both PiLi [9]
and Sync HotStuff [2] to introduce more fault-tolerance to the BFT SMR protocols. In this paper,
we introduce techniques to handle mobile link failures and mobile sluggish faults for our BA, BB
and BFT SMR protocols.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose using the non-lock-step models and the good-case latency metric for Byzantine agree-
ment and broadcast as they better capture what matters in practical BFT SMR. We propose the
first Byzantine agreement, broadcast, and state machine replication protocols with optimal good-
case latency of ∆. We further extend the protocols to weaker models with mobile link failures and
mobile sluggish faults, while achieving optimal good-case latency.
The transformation for mobile link failures, while optimal in terms of latency, brings a blowup
to communication complexity because each message between a two replicas is now relayed by a
group of other replicas. While it may be difficult to come up with a generic transformation that
preserves the communication complexity, it may be possible to directly design protocols in the
mobile link failure model to avoid this communication blowup.
Currently, the mobile link failure model describes slow and lossy links while the mobile sluggish
model describe slow nodes (replicas), and there is no clear way to unify them. An interesting
future direction is to come up with an even weaker model that captures both slow/lossy links and
slow/lossy nodes, and to design protocols in the unified model.
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A Lower Bound on the Good-case Latency under Synchrony
We formally strengthen the lower bound result from [2] to a lower bound on the good-case latency
for both Byzantine agreement and broadcast.
Theorem 1. Any Byzantine agreement or broadcast protocol that is resilient to f ≥ n/3 faults
must have a good-case latency at least ∆.
Proof. We first prove for Byzantine agreement. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there
exists such a Byzantine agreement protocol that is resilient to f ≥ n/3 and have a good-case latency
< ∆. Divide the replicas into three groups P,Q,R each of size up to n/3. Consider three scenarios
as follows. In scenario A, suppose it satisfies the good-case definition: all honest replicas have input
0, and all message delivery and local computation are instantaneous. Only the replicas in Q are
Byzantine and remain silent. By the validity of BA, the protocol ensures that the replicas in P,R
commit 0 in < ∆ time. In scenario B, also suppose it satisfies the good-case definition: all honest
replicas have input 1. Only the replicas in P are Byzantine and remain silent. By the validity of
BA, the protocol ensures that the replicas in Q,R commit 1 in < ∆ time. In scenario C, only the
replicas in R are Byzantine. The replicas in P are honest and have input 0, and the replicas in
Q are honest and have input 1. The Byzantine replicas in R behaves to replicas in P identically
as in scenario A, and behaves to replicas in Q identically as in scenario B. Suppose the messages
between any replica in P and any replica in Q have latency δ = ∆. Then scenario A and C are
indistinguishable to the replicas in P within time < ∆, and they will commit 0 in < ∆ time as in
scenario A. Similarly, the replicas in Q will commit 1 in < ∆ time as in scenario B. This violates
the agreement property of the Byzantine agreement, and therefore such a BA protocol cannot exist.
The proof for Byzantine broadcast is similar. In scenario A, the sender is honest and sends 0,
while in scenario B the sender is also honest and sends 1. In scenario C, the sender is Byzantine,
sends 0 to replicas in P and 1 to replicas in Q. All messages from the sender are delivered
instantaneously, then rest of the proof is identical to that of Byzantine agreement.
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B Missing Proofs
Lemma 4. If a block Bl extending a chain C is certified in view v, then all honest replicas receive
all blocks in C before entering view v + 1.
Proof. Suppose a block Bl extending a chain C is certified in view v, then at least one honest replica
h sends the vote message for Bl at time tv in Step 3 in view v. Then, at time tv −∆ when setting
the vote-timerl in Step 2, h already has the chain C. Therefore, the honest replica has forwarded
all blocks in C at time ≤ tv −∆ according to Step 2. Therefore, all blocks in C forwarded by h will
be received by all honest replicas at time ≤ tv. If any honest replica r enters the new view v + 1
before receiving the blocks in C, according to Step 2 of the protocol, r must have broadcasted the
blame certificate before time tv − 2∆ due to the 2∆ waiting period before entering the next view.
Then, the blame certificate will reach replica h before time tv − ∆, which will prevents h from
sending the vote message, causing contradiction. Therefore, all honest replicas receive all blocks
in C before entering view v + 1.
B.1 Proof for Lemma 2
Proof. Recall that a certified block B′l′ with the certificate Cv′(B′l′) ranks no lower than Cv(Bl) if
either (i) v′ = v and l′ ≥ l, or (ii) v′ > v. Suppose that an honest replica directly commits Bl at
time tc in view v. Then the honest replica receives f + 1 vote messages, where at least one of the
vote message is from an honest replica h. Suppose that h forwards the proposal at time t, then it
sends the vote message at time tv > t+ ∆. It is also clear that tc > tv. According to Step 2 of the
protocol, at time tv −∆, h has received all the blocks in the chain that Bl is extending.
First we prove that any block B′l′ with l
′ ≥ l certified in view v must equal or extend Bl.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that some equivocating block B′l′ is certified in view v. Then
at least one vote for B′l′ comes from an honest replica h
′. Let t′ denote the time when h′ forwards
the proposal, and t′v denote the time when h′ sends the vote message.
• If t′v ≤ tv, then the forwarded proposal from h′ containing the block B′l′ will reach h no later
than t′ + ∆ < t′v ≤ tv. We show that h is able to discover that B′l′ equivocates Bl at time
tv. Since h receives all the blocks in the chain that Bl is extending at time tv −∆, we only
need to show that h also receives all the blocks in the chain that B′l′ is extending at time
tv. When the honest replica h
′ sets its vote-timerl′ at time t′v −∆, it has all the blocks in
the chain C ′ that B′l′ is extending. Then h
′ has forwarded all blocks in C ′ at time t′v − ∆
according to Step 2. Therefore, h should receive all blocks in C ′ at time ≤ t′v ≤ tv, and is able
to discover that Bl equivocates with B
′
l′ This will prevent h from sending the vote message
for Bl, causing contradiction.
• If t′v > tv, then similarly the forwarded proposal from h containing the block Bl will reach
h′ no later than t + ∆ < tv < t′v, which will prevent h′ from sending the vote message, also
causing contradiction.
Therefore, no other equivocating block B′l′ is certified in view v.
Now we show that any block B′l′ certified in view v
′ > v must equal or extend Bl.
By Lemma 4, all honest replicas receive all blocks in the chain C that Bl extends, before entering
the new view v + 1. We show that all honest replicas also receive Cv(Bl) before entering the new
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view v + 1. Since the honest replica h directly commits block Bl, h also broadcasts the certificate
Cv(Bl) at Step 4 at time tc. Therefore, all honest replicas receive the certificate Cv(Bl) no later than
tc + ∆. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that some honest replica r enters the next view v+ 1
before time tc + ∆. According to Step 2 of the protocol, the honest replica r must have received
f + 1 blame messages before time tc −∆ due to the 2∆ waiting window during view-change. The
replica r also broadcasts the blame certificate before time tc−∆ at Step 2 according to the protocol.
The blame certificate will reach replica h before time tc and prevent h from committing, which is
a contradiction. Therefore, all honest replicas enter the new view v+ 1 no earlier than tc + ∆, and
receive the certificate Cv(Bl) before entering the new view v + 1.
Together with the claim that any block B′l′ certified in view v must equal or extend Bl, the
highest certified block at any honest replicas equals or extends Bl when entering view v+ 1. If the
proposal contains S 6= ⊥, then S contains at least one status message from an honest replica, and
thus the block in the proposal must extend Bl in order to get certified. If the proposal contains
S = ⊥, the honest replicas will only vote for blocks that extends a known chain and the highest
certified block, and thus, only blocks that extend Bl can be certified. Hence, the highest certified
block at any honest replicas still equals or extends Bl in view v + 1. By simple induction, in any
future view v′ > v, the highest certified block at any honest replicas must equal or extend Bl,
therefore only blocks that equal or extending Bl can be certified.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5 (Liveness). All honest replicas keep committing new blocks.
Proof. If the leader is honest, we show that a view-change will not occur and all honest replicas
keep committing new blocks. By waiting for 2∆ time before entering the new view, an honest
leader is able to receive the status messages from all honest replicas, because any honest replica
may be at most ∆ later to receive the blame certificate to enter the new view, and the status
message takes at most ∆ to reach the leader. Therefore, the honest leader is able to propose a
block extending the highest certified block B among f + 1 distinct signed status messages as the
first proposal. By Lemma 4, all honest replicas have the chain that B is extending before entering
the new view. Therefore, all honest replicas will vote for the proposal. For next proposals, the
honest leader proposes blocks extending the last proposed block, and all honest replicas will vote
for the proposals as well.
Now we show that any honest replica is able to commit p blocks within 6∆ + (p − 1)α time.
After entering a new view, a time period of 6∆ is sufficient for the first block to get committed,
since (1) the leader may be at most ∆ later to enter the new view, (2) the leader waits for 2∆ to
collect the status message after entering the new view, (3) the block takes at most ∆ to reach all
honest replicas, which triggers the proposal forwarding, (4) any honest replica waits for ∆ before
sending vote, (5) the vote messages take at most ∆ to reach all honest replicas. Then after the first
block, there should be one block proposal from the leader in every α time that gets committed in a
pipeline fashion. Thus any honest replica should be able to commit p blocks within 6∆ + (p− 1)α
time. Any honest leader has sufficient time and does not equivocate. Thus, any honest leader will
not be blamed by any other honest replica, and a view-change will not occur.
On the other hand, any Byzantine leader will be replaced by a view-change if it sends equiv-
ocating blocks or proposals, or does not propose the blocks quickly enough. More specifically, if
the leader sends equivocating blocks or proposals, then all honest replicas will learn the equiv-
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ocation and thus send blame messages to trigger a view-change. If the leader does not propose
the blocks quickly enough so that all honest replicas send blame messages, then a view-change is
triggered. If at least one honest replica is keep committing in time, the vote certificate broadcasted
by this replica when it commits can lead all honest replicas to keep committing new blocks, unless
some honest replica gathers a blame certificate which will lead all honest replicas to perform the
view-change.
C Results for Mobile Sluggish Faults
In this section, we consider the mobile sluggish fault model [9, 18, 2] that models the temporary
violation of the message delay bound at some honest replicas at a given time. The synchronous
model assumes that each message sent by honest replicas can reach any honest replica within ∆
time. Such requirement is crucial for the correctness of our protocols 1∆-BA, 1∆-BB or 1∆-SMR,
where each honest replica expects to receive forwarded proposals from other honest replicas to
detect conflicting proposals. In practice, such unforeseen aberrations in the network may happen
to any honest replica during the execution of the protocol, especially for BFT SMR protocols that
are designed to keep commit values.
We first present the formal definition of mobile sluggish faults [9, 18, 2], and show how to extend
our protocols to tolerate the mobile sluggish faults. To illustrate our techniques, we only present
the extension for the Byzantine fault tolerant state machine replication protocol 1∆-SMR. Similar
approaches apply to 1∆-BA and 1∆-BB as well.
C.1 The Mobile Sluggish Fault Model
In the mobile sluggish fault model [9, 18, 2], an honest replica is either sluggish or prompt at a given
time. Moreover, the set of sluggish replicas can change over time. The messages sent or received
by sluggish replicas may be delayed in the network, while the prompt replicas follow the message
delay bound. Formally, if an honest replica r1 is prompt at time t1, then any message sent by r1
at time ≤ t1 will be received by any honest replica that is prompt at time t2 ≥ t1 + ∆. Intuitively,
in the mobile sluggish model, any message sent by a sluggish replica would satisfy the maximum
message delay bound when the replica becomes prompt.
Following the literature [2], we use f to denote the total number of faults, d to denote the
number of honest but sluggish replicas, and f − d to denote the number of Byzantine replicas. The
set of sluggish replicas is mobile in the sense that it can change at any instance of time. We assume
the number of honest and prompt replicas is always > n/2 at any time, which is necessary to solve
Byzantine agreement or broadcast under the mobile sluggish fault model [18, 2]. Therefore, the
total number of replica is n ≥ 2f + 1, and the number of honest and prompt replicas at any time
is at least f + 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that n = 2f + 1.
C.2 Protocol 1∆-SMR-MSF
In this section, we present a Byzantine fault tolerant state machine replication protocol 1∆-SMR-
MSF under the mobile sluggish model, as in Figure 5. The notations follow from Section 4. To toler-
ate mobile sluggish faults, we apply a technique that adds extra communication rounds in the proto-
col to ensure the message delivery, while keeping the good-case latency of ∆. More specifically, each
Forward/Vote/Blame step in 1∆-SMR protocol is replaced by two steps in the new protocol, namely
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Forward, Timer, Vote1, Vote2, Blame1 and Blame2. The second step (Timer/Vote2/Blame2) can
proceed after the replica receives f + 1 ack/vote1/blame1 messages.
Since now each Forward/Vote/Blame step becomes two steps, we specify which vote or blame
message the certificate consists of. Let Cv(Bk) denote the certificate for height-k block Bk in view
v, consisting of f + 1 valid vote1 messages for block Bk. Let Bv denote the blame certificate in
view v, consisting of f + 1 valid blame1 messages.
Why require f + 1 ack/vote1/blame1 messages? Here we give some intuitive explanations
on why the protocol requires f+1 ack/vote1/blame1 messages to proceed. Under the synchronous
model, when an honest replica sends an ack, vote or blame message at time t, it is guaranteed that
all other honest replica can receive the message at time t+∆. However, with mobile sluggish faults,
the honest replica may be sluggish and the message cannot be received by other replicas. Thus, any
protocol that relies on such a single message will fail, such as the protocol 1∆-SMR that relies on
proposal forwarding to detect leader equivocation. An natural idea is to rely on ≥ f + 1 messages,
then at least one of the message is from an honest and prompt replica. Therefore, we replace the
each Forward, Vote and Blame step in 1∆-SMR with two communication steps in 1∆-SMR-MSF,
to ensure that an honest replica proceeds only after f+1 ack/vote1/blame1 messages are received.
Correctness of Protocol 1∆-SMR-MSF. We first prove two key claims for protocol 1∆-SMR-MSF,
similar to Lemma 5 and 2 for the protocol 1∆-SMR under synchrony.
Lemma 5. If a block Bl extending a chain C is certified in view v, then f + 1 honest replicas have
received all blocks in C before entering view v + 1.
Proof. Suppose a block Bl extending a chain C is certified in view v, then a set A of f + 1 replicas
sends vote1 messages for Bl. Let t denote the earliest time point such that there exist a replica
a ∈ A satisfying the following: (i) a is honest and prompt at time t and (ii) a sends vote1 at time
≤ t. The above definition of time t is valid, since the latest time point when an honest replica in A
sends vote1 satisfies the above two conditions, which means the candidate set for t is non-empty.
Since replica a sends vote1 at time ≤ t, at time t′ ≤ t−∆ when setting the vote-timerl in Step 3,
a receives f + 1 distinct ack messages. Since there are f + 1 honest and prompt replicas at any
time, at time t′ at least one replica that sends ack is honest and prompt. Then, this honest and
prompt replica already has the chain C and forwards all blocks in C at time t′ according to Step 2.
Therefore, the set R of f + 1 honest and prompt replicas at time t′ + ∆ receive all blocks in C. If
any replica r ∈ R enters the new view v + 1 before receiving the blocks in C, according to Step 2
of the protocol, r must have received f + 1 distinct blame2 messages before time t′ −∆ due to the
2∆ waiting period before entering the next view. Therefore, f + 1 replicas broadcast blame2 and
the blame1 certificate before time t′−∆. Then, at least one replica r′ above is honest and prompt
at time t′ − ∆ ≤ t − 2∆, and has broadcasted the blame1 certificate. Consider the honest and
prompt replica a′ ∈ A at time t −∆. By the definition of t, replica a′ has not set vote1 at time
t−∆. Since replica a′ is honest and prompt at time t−∆, replica r′ is honest and prompt at time
t′ −∆ ≤ t− 2∆ and broadcasts the blame1 certificate, a′ receives the blame1 certificate and thus
will not send vote1, causing contradiction. Therefore, the set R of f + 1 honest replicas receive all
blocks in C before entering view v + 1.
Lemma 6. If an honest replica directly commits a block Bl in view v, then a certified block that
ranks no lower than Cv(Bl) must equal or extend Bl.
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Steady State Protocol for Replica i
Let v be the current view number and replica L be the leader of the current view. The leader
proposes a block every α time, where α is a parameter.
1. Propose. The leader L sends 〈propose, Bk,S, v〉L to all other replicas, where Bk =
(bk, hk−1) is a height-k block, containing a batch of new client requests bk and a hash
digest hk−1 = H(Bk−1) of a height-(k − 1) block Bk−1. For the first proposal in a new
view after a view-change, S is a set of f + 1 distinct signed status messages received
during the view-change, and Bk−1 is the highest certified block among blocks in S.
Otherwise, S = ⊥ and Bk−1 is the last block proposed by L.
2. Forward. Upon receiving a valid new proposal 〈propose, Bk, v〉L for a height-k block,
forward the proposal to all other replicas. Once one of the following conditions is true:
(1) S contains f + 1 distinct signed status messages, Bk extends the highest certified
block in S, and Bk extends a chain known to the replica, or (2) S = ⊥, Bk extends
the highest certified block known to the replica, and Bk extends a chain known to the
replica, perform the following. Broadcast any block in the chain that the replica hasn’t
forwarded yet, and broadcast an ack in the form of 〈ack, Bk, v〉i.
3. Timer. Upon receiving f + 1 distinct ack messages 〈ack, Bk, v〉, set vote-timerk to ∆
and start counting down.
4. Vote1. When vote-timerk reaches 0, if no equivocating blocks/proposals signed by L
or a blame certificate Bv is received, send a vote1 to all other replicas in the form of
〈vote1, Bk, v〉i.
5. Vote2. Upon receiving f + 1 distinct vote1 messages 〈vote1, Bk, v〉, form a vote1
certificate Cv(Bk). If no equivocating blocks/proposals signed by L or a blame certifi-
cate Bv is received, broadcasts vote1 certificate Cv(Bk) and a vote2 in the form of
〈vote2, Bk, v〉i.
6. Commit. Upon receiving f+1 distinct signed vote2 messages for block Bk, if no equiv-
ocating blocks/proposals signed by L or a blame certificate Bv are received, broadcast
these f + 1 vote2 messages, and commit Bk with all its ancestors.
View-change Protocol for Replica i
Let L and L′ be the leader of view v and v + 1 respectively.
1. Blame1. If less than p valid blocks are committed in 8∆ + (p − 1)α time in view
v, broadcast 〈blame1, v〉i. If equivocating blocks/proposals signed by L are received,
broadcast 〈blame1, v〉i and the two equivocating blocks/proposals.
2. Blame2. Upon receiving f + 1 valid blame1 messages 〈blame1, v〉, broadcast a blame1
certificate Bv of f + 1 blame1 messages, and a blame2 in the form of 〈blame2, v〉i.
3. New-view. Upon gathering f + 1 distinct 〈blame2, v〉 messages, broadcast these mes-
sages, abort all vote-timer(s) and stop sending ack or vote in view v. Wait for
2∆ time and enter view v + 1. Upon entering view v + 1, send the new leader L′ a
〈status, Bk′ , Cv′(Bk′), v〉i message where Cv′(Bk′) is certificate for the highest certified
block Bk′ . (Ignore any block certified in view ≤ v that is received after this point.) If
the replica is the new leader L′, wait for another 2∆ time upon entering view v + 1.
Figure 5: 1∆-SMR-MSF under the Mobile Sluggish Fault Model
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Proof. Recall that a certified block B′l′ with the certificate Cv′(B′l′) ranks no lower than Cv(Bl) if
either (i) v′ = v and l′ ≥ l, or (ii) v′ > v. Suppose that an honest replica h directly commits Bl in
view v.
First we prove that any block B′l′ with l
′ ≥ l certified in view v must equal or extend Bl. Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that some equivocating block B′l′ is certified in view v, then there is a
set R′ of f + 1 replicas that sends vote1′ for B′l′ . Since the replica h commits Bl, it receives f + 1
valid vote2 messages, which implies that at least one honest replica has sent vote2 after receiving
f + 1 vote1 messages. Let the set of f + 1 replicas that sends vote1 messages above be R, and
let t be the earliest time point that some honest replica r in R sends vote1. The definition of t
is valid since at least one replica in R is honest. Also let t′ be the earliest time point that some
honest replica r′ in R′ sends vote1′.
• Suppose that t′ ≤ t. According to the protocol, at time point t′ − ∆, the honest replica r′
receives f + 1 ack′ messages for B′l′ and thus f + 1 replicas have sent ack
′ at t′ −∆. Since
there are f+1 honest and prompt replicas at any time point, at least one of the above replicas
that sends ack′ is honest and prompt at time t′ − ∆. According to Step 2, this replica has
also sent all blocks in the chain C′ that B′l′ extends. Similarly, at least one of the replicas in
R is honest and prompt at time t′ ≤ t, and this replica should receive the ack′ message and
all blocks in the chain C′. Since this replica already has the chain that Bl extends according
to Step 2, it will discover that Bl and B
′
l′ equivocates and thus not sending vote1. This is a
contradiction, hence no equivocating block B′l′ can be certified in this case.
• Suppose that t′ > t. Similar to the previous case, at time point t−∆, at least one honest and
prompt replica sends ack. Again, at least one honest and prompt replica in R′ should receive
the ack message and not send vote1′. This contradicts the assumption that b′ is certified,
and hence no equivocating block B′l′ can be certified in this case.
Now we show that any block B′l′ certified in view v
′ > v must equal or extend Bl.
We first show that f+1 honest replicas receive Cv(Bl) before entering the new view v+1. Since
the honest replica h directly commits Bl, h receives distinct vote2 messages from a set A of f + 1
replicas. Let t denote the earliest time point such that there exist a replica a ∈ A satisfying the
following: (i) a is honest and prompt at time t and (ii) a sends vote2 before or at time t. The
above definition of time t is valid, since the latest time point when an honest replica in A sends
vote2 satisfies the above two conditions, which means the candidate set for t is non-empty. Since
replica a is honest and prompt at time t and sends vote2 before or at time t, by the definition
of the honest and prompt, replica a’s vote2 message and vote1 certificate Cv(Bl) will reach the
set R of all honest and prompt replica at time t + ∆. We will prove that R is the set of f + 1
honest replicas that receive Cv(Bl) before entering the new view v + 1. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction, any honest replica r ∈ R enters the new view v+ 1 at time t′+ ∆ where t′ < t before
receiving Cv(Bl). According to the protocol, the honest replica r must have received f + 1 blame2
messages at time point t′ −∆ due to the 2∆ waiting period before entering the next view. Among
the f + 1 replicas that send blame2 above, at least one replica r′ is honest and prompt at time
t′−∆. According to the protocol, r′ receives the blame1 certificate before time t′−∆ and forwards
the blame1 certificate to all other replicas. Now consider the honest and prompt replica a′ ∈ A at
time t′, since t′ < t, by the definition of t, a′ has not sent vote2. Since r′ is honest and prompt at
time t′ −∆, a′ is honest and prompt at time t′, a′ should receive the blame1 certificate Bv sent by
r′ at time t′. This will prevent a′ from sending the vote2 message, causing contradiction. Hence,
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R is the set of f + 1 honest replicas that receive Cv(Bl) before entering the new view v + 1. By a
similar proof of Lemma 5, we can also show that R receive the chain that Bl extends.
Together with the claim that any block B′l′ certified in view v must equal or extend Bl, the
highest certified block at any honest replicas equals or extends Bl when entering view v+ 1. If the
proposal contains S 6= ⊥, then S contains at least one status message from an honest replica, and
thus the block in the proposal must extend Bl in order to get certified. If the proposal contains
S = ⊥, the honest replicas will only vote for blocks that extends a known chain and the highest
certified block, and thus, only blocks that extend Bl can be certified. Hence, the highest certified
block at any honest replicas still equals or extends Bl in view v + 1. By simple induction, in any
future view v′ > v, the highest certified block at any honest replicas must equal or extend Bl,
therefore only blocks that equal or extending Bl can be certified.
Theorem 8 (Safety). Honest replicas always commit the same block Bk for each height k.
Proof. Suppose two blocks Bk and B
′
k are committed at height k at two honest replicas. Suppose
Bk is committed due to Bl being directly committed in view v, and B
′
k is committed due to B
′
l′
being directly committed in view v′. Without loss of generality, suppose v ≤ v′, and for v = v′,
further assume that l ≤ l′. Since Bl is directly committed and Bl′ is certified and ranks no lower
than Cv(Bl), by Lemma 6, Bl′ must equal or extend Bl. Thus, B′k = Bk.
Theorem 9 (Liveness). All honest replicas keep committing new blocks during the periods in which
all honest replicas stay prompt.
Proof. We assume all honest replicas stay prompt.
If the leader L is honest, a view-change will not occur and all honest replicas keep committing
new blocks. The 2∆ waiting window after entering the new view is sufficient for the new leader to
collect all status messages from the honest replicas, since any honest replica enters the new view at
most ∆ later than the leader and the status message takes at most ∆ time to reach L. Therefore,
the honest leader is able to propose a block extending the highest certified block B among f + 1
distinct signed status messages as the first proposal. By Lemma 5, f + 1 honest replicas have the
chain that B is extending before entering the new view. Therefore, all honest replicas will vote for
the proposal. For next proposals, the honest leader proposes blocks extending the last proposed
block, and all honest replicas will vote for the proposals as well.
Now we show that any honest replica is able to commit p blocks within 8∆ + (p − 1)α time.
After entering a new view, a time period of 8∆ is sufficient for the first block to get committed,
since (1) the leader may be at most ∆ later to enter the new view, (2) the leader waits for 2∆ after
entering the new view, (3) the proposal takes at most ∆ to reach all honest replicas, which triggers
the ack message, (4) the ack messages take at most ∆ to reach all honest replicas, (5) any honest
replica waits for ∆ before sending vote1, (6) the vote1 messages take at most ∆ to reach all honest
replicas, (7) the vote2 messages take at most ∆ to reach all honest replicas. Then after the first
block, there should be one block proposal from the leader in every α time that gets committed in
a pipeline fashion. Therefore, an honest leader has sufficient time and does not equivocate, and
thus will not be blamed by any honest replicas. Then, all honest replicas will exchange the ack
and vote messages and commit.
On the other hand, any Byzantine leader will be replaced by a view-change if it sends equiv-
ocating blocks or does not propose the blocks quickly enough, similar to the proof of Theorem
5.
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Theorem 10 (Good-case Latency). During the periods in which all honest replicas stay prompt,
if the leader is honest, then the proposed value will be committed in ∆ time after being proposed.
Proof. When the leader is honest, it proposal will take time δ to reach all replicas. Then, the ack
messages take δ to reach all honest replicas. After receiving the ack messages, all honest replica will
wait for time ∆ before sending the vote1 message. The vote1 messages take δ to reach all honest
replicas, and trigger them to send vote2 messages. Finally, the above vote2 messages reach all
honest replicas after δ time, leading to commit at all honest replicas. Therefore, the any proposed
value will be committed in ∆ + 4δ = ∆ time.
Theorem 11. 1∆-SMR-MSF protocol solves Byzantine fault tolerant state machine replication in
the authenticated setting under the mobile sluggish fault model, with a good-case latency of ∆ per
command and optimal resilience of f < n/2.
Proof. Proved by Theorem 8, 9 and 10.
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